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The Time is Never Ripe
Theda Skocpol
Introduction
My presentation for today’s ~ary l~’ture uses a recent episode m
US politics - President Bill Clinton’s 1993 Health Security proposal for
comprehensive health insurance reform, and the subsequent conservative
political backlash against k - as a window into the history of attempts to
create universal health insurance in the United States. This episode also
reveals much about the present and probable ft.,tore of social-welfare
politics in the United States.
On September 22, 1993, President Bill Clinton gave a stirring
speech calling for "America to fix a health care system that is badly
broken ... giving every American health security - health care that’s
always there, health care that can never be taken away".1 Millions
listened to the President, and polls taken right after the speech and over
the next few weeks registered strong support.2 THE CLINTON PLAN
IS ALIVE ON ARRIVAL trumpeted the New York Times, as moderate
Republicans and leaders of groups ~ith a stake in the health care system
promised to co-operate in working out reforms)
Historic themes resonated as the Clinton plan ~s unveiled. Its very
title "Health Security" harkened back to the Social Security Act of 1935,
the charter legislation for America’s version of the modem welfare state.
And the "Health Security card" that the President said every American
would receive was obviously meant to encourage a sense of safe and
honourable entitlement such as Americans feel they have in Social
* From the prepared text, as reprinted in Erik Eekholm, (ed.) 1993. Solving
America’s Health-Care Crisis (New York: Times Books, pp. 301-314.
Paul Starr, "What Happened to Health Care Reform?", The American Prospect.
No. 20, Winter 1995, p. 20; and Lawrence P,. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapixo, "Dan~t
Blame the Public for Failed Health Care Reform’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy
and Law. Vol. 20, No. 2, Summer 1995, p. 418.
3 Adam Clymer, "The Clinton Plan is Alive on Arrival", New York Times, Sunday,
October 3, 1993, p. E3.
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Security. This contributory social insurance programme for the elderly is
the closest the United States has to a universal social policy, and it is
very popular across lines of class and partisan division.
How ironic, then, that just a bit over one year later both the Clinton
Health Security plan and the Democratic party - the legatee of the very
New Deal whose achievements President Clinton had hoped to imitate
and extend - lay in a shambles. Voters went to the polls in November,
1994, and registered widespread victories for Republicans, not only
those running for statehouses, governorships, and the US Senate, but
also those running for the House of Representatives, which changed
partisan hands for the first time in four decades. Many of the
Republicans who won in 1994 are ideologically hostile to governmental
social provision, and their "Contract With America" calls for
dismantling social programmes and hobbling the federal government.4
The New Deal tradition is dead, post-election commentators have
declared.
To understand why the 1993-94 attempt at comprehensive health
reform failed, we need to put this attempt at comprehensive health
reform into historical perspective. We also need to understand why
President Clinton devised a plan that was not only defeated in Congress
but also inadvertently helped to fuel a massive political upheaval. Only
against the backdrop of the upheaval, moreover, can we make sense of
possibilities for the future of US politics.
Earlier Attempts to Expand Health Insurance in the United States
Rep~y during the twentieth century, reformers in the United
States have been certain that the time had come to enact broad, publicly
financed or regulatext health insurance. Such confidence especially
bubbled up in the late 1910s, again during the 1930s and 1940s, and yet
again during the 1960s. In 1964-65 there was a partial success, when
¯ C°ntractWithAmerica:TheB°ldPlanbyRep’NemCn’ngrich’Rep’DickArmey
and the House of Representatives to Change the Nation, edited by Ed Gillespie and
Bob Shellhas (New York Times Books, Random House, 1994). For the outlook fi’om
which current initiatives flow, see Newt Gingrich, Window of Opportuni~: A
Blueprint for the Future New York: Tom Doherty Azsoeiates, 1984, especially
Chapters 4-6.
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Medicare was enacted for the elderly and Medicaid to provide health
coverage to the very poor. At other times, however, reformers sought
general health coverage for working Americans, and their efforts ended
in failure, as well as in political backlash. The hopes of advocates of one
or another form of public health insurance were dashed on the shoals of
the US political institutions, and against the rocks of fervent
conservative opposition against "bureaucratic" governmental
inte~ention.
From 1916 through 1920, the American Association for Labour
Legislation (AALL) campaigned for public "sickness insurance" to
cover American workingrnen and their dependants,s Founded in 1906
and devoted to the use of social science research to promote various
kinds of "labour legislation" in the United States, the AALL was a small
association of reform-minded professionals, mostly university
professors, labour statisticians, and social workers. As dozens of US
states enacted regulations requiring businesses to provide industrial
accident insurance, the experts of the A.ALL decided that health
insurance would be "the next great step" in the march toward
comprehensive social insurance. AALL members believed that there
would be inevitable progress toward the enactment of public social
insurance in all civilised industrialising nations; and the United States
would have to be part of this world~Sde movement. Reformers in the
Progressive Era argued that sickness insurance - to be funded jointly by
contributions from business, wage-earners, and government tax revenues
- would help to prevent poverty among wage-earners. Health insauance
would also promote economic and social "efficiency", because it would
encourage employers, employees, and citizens alike to promote healthful
conditions at work and in communities.
To the experts of the AALL, the logical case for the US states to
enact health insurance was so obviously rational, and the worldwide
Ronald L. Numbers, Almost Persuaded: American Physicians and Compulsory
Health Insurance, 1912-1920 (Baltimore~ MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1978; Paul Start, 77~e Social Transformation of American Medicine New York: Basic
Books, 1982, pp. 237-257, and Theda Skoepol, Protecting Soldiers and Mother$: The
Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, MA: The Bell.map
Press of Harvard University Press, 1992), Chapter 3.
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course of "social progress" so dearly inevitable, that they were hardy
prepared for the spread of ideologically impassioned opposition to their
legislative proposals. Yet there were plenty of potential opponents.
Private insurance companies opposed the death benefits that were to be
included in health insurance as designed by the AALL. Business
associations such as the National Association of Manufacturers looked
askance at the new taxes that health insurance would entail. Private
physicians and various state and local units of the American Medical
Association worded about the imposition of governmental regulation.
And certain labour leaders opposed all forms of public social insurance
as an intrusion on union autonomy. As the United States entered World
War I, idcologues opposed to health insurance highlighted the bogey of
German statism, using opposition to "bureaucracy" as an effective
rallying cry for the various forces potentially opposed to health
insurance. Health insurance was labelled "un-American". What is more,
the increasingly hysterical clamas of the enemies of health insurance fell
upon the ears of a middle-class public that were already skeptical about
governmental efficiency and honesty, not to mention wary of new taxes.
US government at the turn of the twentieth century had developed few
bureaucratic capacities, and man), elite and middle-class people did not
trust government to administer social programmes effectively.
The normally cumbersome operations of US governmental
institutions - ~-hich required reformers of the early 1900s to move
proposals, state by state, through two legislative houses, past potential
vetos by governors, and around potential constitutional and judicial
obstacles - insured that opponents to health insurance would have plenty
of lime to build coalitions, and many institutional points at which to
register opposition,s By 1920, the AALL-sponsored campaigns for
health insurance had been deflected altogether in most US states, and
defeated in pitched battles in California and New York. The progress
that had seemed so "inevitable" a few years earlier ~as stopped dead in
6 David Brian Robertson, "The Bias of American Federalian~ The Limits of
Welfare-State Development in the Progressive Era", Jaut’nal of Policy Hista~7, Vol. l,
No. 3 (1989): pp. 261-291, and Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers. Chapter 4.
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its tracks; and the AALL itself permanently lost momentum a-Rer the
nation-wide defeat of its all-out campaign for health insurance.
During the 1930s and 1940s, efforts to promote public health
insurance - now for middle-class as well as working-class Americans -
were pursued by various groups of intellectuals and officials located in
and around the various administrations of President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and President Harry Truman.7 At first, reform proposals
called for federal incentives for optional state-level health insurance, but
during and after World War II reformers’ hopes shifted toward a
comprehensive, national system of health insurance, modelled on
contributory old-age insurance. Echoing the faith of the progressives of
the 1910s, man3, New Dealers were confident that the United States
would inevitably "complete" what the Social Security Act of 1935 had
begun, building a comprehensive welfare state that would include
national employment assurance, unemployment benefits, and health
insurance coverage for all Americans.
President Roosevek never gave full backing to health insurance
proposals during the 1930s; and they were left out of the legislation for
Social Security because of fears that opposition from the American
Medical Association might sink the entire bill if health insurance was
included. Nevertheless, the hopes of advocates of national health
insurance looked as if they might be realised in the 1940s, particularly
when Harry Truman featured this reform in his ultimately victorious bid
for re-election in 1948.
Once again, reformists hopes were shattered. Throughout the 1930s
and 1940s, all proposals for public health insurance were strenuously
opposed by the formidable American Medical Association, which from
the 1920s had become truly a peak association of private fee-for-service
doctors in thousands of local communities and all the states of the
United States. By the 1940s, moreover, private insurance companies had
developed an interest in offering health insurance to the middle class.
7 Daniel S. Hirslffield, The Lost Reform (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1970); Monte M. Poen, Harry S. Truman and the A~Iedical Lobby (Columbia,
MO: University of Missouri Press, 1979); and Start, Social Transformation, pp.
275-289.
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During and fight after World War II, major industrial employers were
encouraged by wartune controls and provisions of the federal tax code
to start offenng health insurance as a "fringe benefit" to workers,s Thus,
not only were industrialists opposed to paying taxes for pubic health
insurance; many of them also become committed to their nascent private
systems of health benefits - which had been used as bargaining chips in
lieu of higher wages, and which did not seem so costly at that phase of
history.
Just as ideological rallying cries against "German statism" brought
together potential opponents of workingraen’s health insurance during
the late 1910s, the various forces ready to weigh in against Truman’s
plans for national health msurance were brought together in late 1940s
by cries of opposition to "Communism" and "socialised medicine." The
Cold War was emerging, as the United States shifted from its World
War 17 alliance with the beleaguered Russians against the Nazis, toward
global super-power rivalry with an imperial Soviet Union. Within the
United States, witch hunts were launched against actually or allegedly
pro-Communist public officials and labour union leaders. At this
conjuncture, it was simple for opponents of national health insurance to
label it "socialist", rapidly shiflfng public opinion away from public
financing of health care costs. Reformers who had thought they were
furthering a logical extension of the New Deal and Social Security,
suddenly found themselves in an ideologically uncomfortable position -
appeanng to support something un-American, even "subversive". To be
sure, the newly powerful CIO unions initially preferred to support
Truman’s plan for national health insurance. But many CIO leaders were
themselves victims of anti-Communist crusades. And slzong industrial
unions were able, when necessary, to fall back on contract bargaining
for employer-provided health insurance coverage. From the 1950s
through the 1970s, that is exactly what they did, enabling many
’ Beth Stevens, "Blurting the Boundaries: How the Federal Government Has
Influenced Welfare Benefits in the Private Sector", pp. 123-148 in The Polit,’cs of
Social Policy in the United States, edited by Margaret Weir, Arm Shola Orloff, and
Theda Skocpol (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1988).
6
unionised workers to enjoy very generous health benefits even in the
absence of national health insurance.
We see, in short, that both during the 1910s and again during the
1930s and 1940s, experts and reformers relied upon rational analysis
and arguments about how to solve problems of efficiency or access.
Reformers were confident that time was on their side, and that public
health insurance (of one sort or another) would "inevitably" be enacted
in the United States. But each time, not only were there powerful
opponents to reform, debates also quickly took a bitterly ideological
turn. Such ideological turns were not anticipated by the rationally
minded experts, yet they led to defeats for proposals that might well
have gained broad citizen support, had the3’ been more calmly discussed
- or effectively dramatised - in the national political process. In each
historical episode, locally rooted opponents of national governmental
authority gained leverage through state legislatures or Congress to defeat
attempts at comprehensive health reform in America. Following the
policy defeats came a more general backlash against governmental
intervention in US economic and social life.
Why Prospects for Health Reform Looked Better in the 1990s
If past battles over health insurance for the United States turned out
to be very ideological, leaving the rational reformers mystified and
demoralised, by the early 1990s it seemed that the time was finally ripe
for the United States to move toward universal health insurance. Many
US corporations were ready to support governmentally led efforts at
health reform. Costs to employers who insured their workers had
skyrocketed during the 1970s and 1980s, and many large businesses
were experiencing extra costs shifted to them from other businesses who
employed their employees’ family members, but did not help to pay for
health coverage. Physicians were no longer as big an obstacle as in the
past. The American Medical Association (AMA), historically the
bitterest of all enemies of governmentally sponsored health reforms, no
longer represented as high a proportion of doctors as in the past. The
AMA had also moderated its stance, coming up with its own plan for
legislation to guarantee health insurance to all Americans?
By 1990, US public support for national health reform was at a 40
year high in public opinion polls, and Americans overwhelmingly felt
that insurance coverage should be available to everyoneJ° In the fall of
1991, Democrat Hams Wofford’s improbable triumph in a special
senatorial election in Pennsylvania suddenly brought the issue of health
care reform to the front burner in Washington D.C.n The financing of
health care had become a middle-class issue as well as a problem for the
working near-poor, whose jobs often do not carry health benefits.
Middle-class concerns focused on "dramatic increases in health care
costs", as more and more employers shifted expenses toward covered
employees, and on "fear of losing all or part of their health care benefits
in our employment-based system of health insurance", particularly
during a period of extensive corporate do~-sizing)2
Most Americans looked to the federal government for action and
believed that Democrats were more likely than Republicans to promote
needed health care refonnsJ3 Not surprisingly, the leading Democratic
presidential candidates in 1992, including Bill Clinton of Arkansas,
committed themselves to pursue national health care reform if elected.
Health care reform, after all, looked like an excellent priority for 1990s
9    American Medical Association, Health Access America: The AMA Proposal to
Improve Access to Affordable, Quality Health Care (Chicago, IL: AMA, 1990); and
James S. Todd, S.V. Seekins, J.A. Kxiehbaum, and L.IC Harvey, "Health Access
America - Stxengtheanng the US Health Care System", Journal of the American
Medical,a.ssocian’on, Vol. 265, No. 19 (1991), pp. 2503-2506.
l* Robert J. Blandon and Karen Danelan, "Public Opinion and Efforts to Reform
the US Health Care System: Confronting l.qsues of Cost-Containment and Access to
Care", Stanford Law and Policy Review flail 1991), p. 146.
n Dale Russakoff, "How Woffard Rode Health Care to Washington", Washington
Post National Weekly Edition, November 25 - December 1, 1991, pp. 14-15; and
Robert J. Blandort, Ulrike S. Szalay, Drew E. Airman, and Gerald Chervinsky, "The
1991 Pennsylvania Senate Race and National Health Insurance", Journal of American
Health Policy (January-February 1992), pp. 21-24.
’~ Blandon and Donelan, "Public Opinion and Efforts to Reform", p. 147.iJ Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Public Opinion’s Tilt Against
Private Enterprise," Health Affairs (Spring 1 ) (1994), pp. 285-298.
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Democrats. The party needed to overcome racial divisions over
intolerable issues such as welfare reform and affirmative action; it had
to highlight issues that could unite more and less privileged Americans.
Successful sponsorship of national health care reform could revive the
lectoral fortunes of the Democratic pan),, provided that ways could be
found to extend insurance to low-wage working families wlfilc
simultaneously making coverage for the middle class more secure and
less costly.
The Clinton administration has been accused of championing a
"liberal", "government-takeover" approach to health reform. On the
contrary, during the 1992 presidential campaign~ Bill Clinton gravitated
toward "competition ~vithm a budget" as an approach to national health
care reform explicitly distinct from previously defined liberal as well as
conservative al’tematives. Once he found this middle way, Clinton never
wavered from it.
Back in 1991 and 1992, the major visible alternatives in the
stmmering national debate over health care reform were three, and it was
clear that Bill Clinton would not accept two that appeared to be on the
right and left. "Market-oriented" reforms not aiming for universal
coverage or cost consols were identified v~4th the Republicans, and they
had very little appeal for Democrats (and little backing from health
policy experts, for that matter)?~ Apparently at the other end of the
partisan spectrum were various sorts of Canadian-style "single payer"
schemes calling for taxes to displace private health insurance. These
were favoured by a few health policy experts, by various advocacy
groups, by a sizeable group of Congressional Democrats, including a
presidential hopeful, Senator Robert Kerrey)s
~’ Republican incremental proposals, and criticimns of them. are discussed in
Richard A. Knox, "Health Care Leaps to Top of Political Agenda", Boston Globe,
Sunday December 29, 1991, pp. 1, 16.
~s For versions of single-payer, see: K. Grumbach, T. Bodanheimer, D.U.
Himmelstein and S. Wodihandler, "Liberal Benefits, Conservative Spending: The
Physicians for a National Health Program Proposal", Journal of the American Medical
Association, Vol. 265 (1991), pp. 2549-2554; and Robert Kerrey, Health USA Act of
199l (Wash~gtoa DC: US Senate, 1991), which is explained in Robert Kerrey, "Why
America Will Adopt Comprehensive Health Care Reform", The American Prospect,
9
An excellent technical case could be made that a single-payer
approach could save more than enough on simplified administrative
costs to cover all of the uninsured; and the Canadian experience a_~r the
1970s suggested that it could also significantly reduce the rate of
increase of national, health care expenditures, while maximising the
day-to-day autonomy of patients and health providers?6 Nevertheless,
most US politicians feared to endorse single-payer, because it would
necessitate switching from employer-provided imsurance and private
insurance prenfiums toward explicit general or payroll taxation. Frank
talk about raising taxes was considered the kiss of death. Walter
Mondale had apparently shot himself in the foot with such talk in 1984;
and George Bush was in lxouble during the 1992 presidential campaign
for having broken his "read my lips" pledge never to raise taxes. Not
surprisingly, Bill Clinton rejected the single-payer approach. Determined
to win middle-class votes for the Democratic ticket, Clinton was running
a moderate campaign based on promises to reduce taxes on everyone
except the very rich.
The third major alternative in 1991-92 was "play or pay", so
labelled because it would require all employers either to offer and
partially pay for health insurance for all employees, or else pay a kind of
"quit tax" to help subsidise expanded govermuental coverage for all
Americans not employed and insured by their employers. This approach
had come to seem the most "pragmatic" road to national health insurance
by the start of the 1992 presidential campaign.17 Key Democratic
Senators were sponsoring legislation embodying play or pay?s It had
No. 6 (Summer 1991), pp. 81-90.
1~ Theodore R. Marmor and Jerry L. Mashaw, "Canada’s Health Insurance and
Ours: The Real Lessons, the Big Choices", The American Prospect, No. 3 flail 1990,
pp. 18-29).
~7 For a cogent explication of the approach and its practical rationale, see Ronald
Pollack and Phyllis Torda, "The Pragmatic Road Toward National Health Insurance",
The American Prospect, No. 6 (Summex 1991 ), pp. 92-I 00.
~) Mark A. Peterson, "Momentum Toward Health Reform in the US Senate",
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vot. 17, No. 3 1992, pp. 553-573.
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also been endorsed m 1990 by the Pepper Commission and by the
National Leadership Coalition of big employers and unions)9
As Clinton sparred during the presidential primaries with Senators
Robert Kerrey and Paul Tsongas, he found he had to go beyond a
general promise and outline what he would actually do about national
health reform. Clinton’s first move in January 1992 dallied with play or
pay.2° But this proved transitory. As President Bush attacked the payroll
taxes and alleged anti-business thrust of play or pay proposals identified
with Congressional Democrats, Clinton pulled back from that approach.
An intellectual conversion also occurred during the spring and
summer, as Clinton talked with such advisers as John Gammendi, the
Insurance Commissioner of California, Walter Zehnan, and Paul Start.2~
Building upon and modifying ideas from the economist Alain Enthoven,
these advisers convinced Clinton that it would be possible to use
regional insurance purchasing agencies along with very modest new tax
subsidies to push the employed-based US health care system
simultaneously toward cost--efficiency and universal coverage.
This approach, dubbed "competition within a budget", was just what
Bill Clinton was looking for! It promised, at once, to satisfy the public’s
t9 The Pepper Commission. A Call for Action: Final Report (Wasl~on DC: US
Bipartisan Commission on Comprehensive Health Care, 1990), as explained in J.D.
Rockefeller, IV, "A Call for Action: The Pepper Commission’s Blueprint for Health
Care Reform", Journal of the American Medical Asseciation, Vol. 265, No. 19
(1991), pp. 2507-2510, and in Judith Feder, "The Pepper Commission’s Proposals",
SoeiallnsurancelssuesfortheNinetie~, Preceedings of the Third Conference of the
National Academy of Social Insurance, edited by Paul N. Van de Water (Dubuque, IA:
Kendall/I-Iunt, 1992), pp. 53-58. On the National Leadership Coalition. see Susan B.
Garland, "Already, Big Business’ Health Plan Ian’t Feeling So Hot", Business Week
(November Ig, 1991), p. 48.
:* Bill Clinton for President Committee, "Bill Clinton’s American Health Care Plan:
National Insurance Reform to Cut Costs and Cover Everybody" (typescript, Little
Rock, Arkansas, January 1992), p. 7.
:~ For overvie~x~ of the relevant ideas, see: Alain Enthovan and Richard Knonick,
"A Consumer Choice Plan for the 1990s", New England Journal of Medicine, 320
(January 5, 1989); John Garamendi, "California Health Care in the 21st Century: A
Vision for Reform", Deparunant of Insurance, State of California, February 1992; and
Paul Start and Walter Zelmaa, "A Bridge to Compromise: Competition Within A
Budget", Health Affairs (Supplement 1993), pp. 7-23.
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desire for affordable universal coverage, and to further the cost
reductions so favottred by powerful elites.= Managed competition
would please big employers and large insurance companies, allowing the
would-be president to court and work with these powerful interests, just
as moderate southern Democratic governors have always done. TI~s
approach could presumably also be sold both to mainstream Democrats
who care primarily about universal coverage and to ’qqew Democrats" in
the Democratic Leadership Council who want market-oriented reforms
that minimise taxes and public spending.
Indeed, Clinton ~ts especially attracted to the public finance
features of managed competition within a budget. If he were to be
elected president after a campaign promising deficit reduction and
avoidance of taxes, he was going to have to devise a health care reform
plan that did not include huge new taxes - and a plan with sufficient
regulatory teeth to persuade Congressional Budget Office officials that
future cost-reductions would be forthcoming in Medicaid and Medicare.
Competition u4thin a budget might enable a new Clinton administration
to do all of this, while still promising universal health security. The
budgetary logic of the approach was irresistible to a moderate
Democrat who wanted both to cut the deficit and free resources for new
public investments.
In November 1992 Bill Clinton was elected President of the United
States w4th 43 per cent of the popular vote (and a much more
commanding margin m the electoral college). The new President soon
turned to working on economic reforms and budget cutting. Meanwhile,
he convened a Health Reform Task Force under the leadership of his
longtime friend, business consultant Ira Magazmer, and the First Lady,
Hillary Rodham Clinton.23 Most of the work of the Task Force took
~2 Ordinary Americans care most about atlaining secure protection and keeping
their o~a insurance payments low, while experts and institutional leaders such as
employers and politicians are obsessed with spending less overall, and having each
major organizational sector spend less on health care. On this, see Robert J. Blendon,
Tracey Stelzer Hyams, and John M. Bea-tson, "Bridging the Gap Betwe~ Ex~ert and
Public Views on Health Care Reform", Journal of the American Medical Association,
Vol. 269, No. 19 (May 19, 1993), pp. 2573-2578.
On Magazine~, See Robert Pear, "An Idez.!ist’s New Task: To Revamp Health
12
place in a few frantic months from January to May of 1993, but its
report could not be finalised until afler President Clinton got his first
budget through the contentions Congress at the end of the summer.
During its life, the Clinton Task Force mobilised at least part-time
participation from hundreds of governmental officials, health policy
experts on loan to government, plus Congressional staffers and some
state-level officials. Groups with a stake in the current US health care
system were not officially represented, but the Task Force did hold many
hearings, and consulted with hundreds of representatives of stakeholder
groups. The purpose of such consultations was not political bargaining;
rather Task Force members tried to discover ideas and concerns that
they could take into account as the President’s overall approach to health
reform was fleshed out in detail.
When the Clinton admmistratinn’s policy plarmers finished their
work in the late summer of 1993, they had fleshed out a plan very much
along the ideas about "managed competition within a budget" that Bill
Clinton had outlined while he was rumung for president. The plan
encouraged competition among private health plans. It used
governmental regulations rather than t~x revenues. And it emphasised
cost containment as well as the spread of imsatmace coverage to all
citizens. Briefly, it looked as if almost everyone in the United States -
except a few small insurance companies - had reason to accept the
Health Secure, plan that President Clinton so successfully launched on
September 23, 1993 as a good start toward comprehensive reform.
Although no one believed that the President’s proposals would move
through Congress without significant modification, it was widely
believed in the fall of 1993 that the United States was "certain " to enact
some sort of comprehensive health financing reforms during the coming
moIlths.
Democrats and Health Reformers in Disarray
By a year later, however, the Clinton Health Security plan was dead
and buried, and no substitute measures had been enacted either. When
and why did this apparently promising effort at comprehensive health
Care", The New York Times (’Friday, February 26, 1993), p. A14.
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reform fail? Analysts have placed the fatal wounding of comprehensive
health reform in 1993-94 at various points in time, ranging from the
earliest months of the Clinton administration when the Task Force did its
work, to the end of the summer of 1994 when the US Congress at last
gave up trying to fashion a "mainstream" compromise preserving some
elements of what the President aimed to achieve. In my view, the critical
period was from the time of the President’s late September speech
through March 1994 - by which point concerted partisan campaigns
against universal health reform had locked into place, and the support of
elite and middle-class Americans for ambitious health reforms had
begun to slide inexorably do~w.hill. From then on, momentum toward
inclusive reform was irretrievably lost.
Bythe early 1990s, the faith of Americaus in the federal government
to "do what is right’’ (either "always" or "most of the time") was at an
extremely low point; less than one-fifth of Americans had that level of
trust in Washington DC.24 Against this backdrop, it is remarkable that
for a lime Americans were open to the idea that the federal government
might be able to ensure health security for everyone. Given general
skepticism about the contemporary US national government’s
capabilities, surely the President and his advisers should have realised
that they had to follow up the introductory September speech with a
convincing vision of how new governmental regulations would actually
work to deliver on the overall goals the President had articulated. They
also had to unite an array of groups and politicians in and around the
Democratic party in support of the Health Security proposal. But during
the fall of 1993 and the winter of 1994 the Clinton administrahon and its
political allies did not wage a successful campaign on behalf of their
proposed legislation.
There were some good reasons why the Clinton health reformers
failed to do enough to sustain public support and deepen public
~4 A time-line of the percentage of Americans, from t958 to 1994, answering
"al,~ays" or "most of the time" to the question "How much of the time can you trust
the government in Washington to do what is right?" has been put together by my
colleague Robert Putnam from National Election Studies (1958-1990) end Gallup
Polls (1992-1994).
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understanding. The first reason flows from something political scientists
know well: chief executive officers do not control their o~aa agendas.25
Soon after President Clinton introduced his health reform plan, he got
diverted into dealing with the Somalia crisis, and then into the protracted
public and Congressional campaign to pass the North American Free
Trade Act (NAFTA), an international treaty initiative that had been
passed dow~ to him from previous presidents.
Looking at the situation more broadly, there ~s also the problem of
the weakness of the insfitt~onally given means of political
communication and mobilisation open to Democrats and other
progressive political forces in the United States of the 1990s. The
Democratic party no longer has a nationally widespread, locally rooted
infrastructure of loyal local organisations and allied groups (such as
labour unions) through which concerted grass-roots political campaigns
can be run.2s The US conservative right now has such an infrastructure,
in the form of grass-roots small business and Christian fundamentalist
groups and Rush Limbaugh-style talk radio stations. But Democratic
politicians, including a Democratic president, depend on pollsters, media
consultants, and television to get messages out to the citizenry.
Given the way the national media operates, the President of the
United States cannot be sure of getting television coverage. Had
President Clinton asked for more airtime, perhaps the networks would
have refused to cover additional explanatory speeches soon after his
September 1993 Health Security address. There is also the matter of
how US television and newspapers cover complicated and controversial
policy issues. As various observers have argued, the media tend to focus
not on the substance and adequacy of proposals, but on the "horse races"
among conflicting pohticians and interest groupsY They look at who is
Charles O. Jones, The Presidency in a Separated System (Washthglon DC: the
Brookings Institution, 1994), Chapter 5.
a6 David 1L Mayhew, Placing Parties in American Politics: Organisation,
Electoral Sem)~gs. and Govcrnment ActiviW in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1986), Chapter 11; and Marshall Cranz, "Voters in the
Cresshalrs: How Technology and the Market are Destroying Polities", The American
Prospect, No. 16 (Winter 1994), pp. 100-109.
27 Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Joseph Cappella, "Newspaper and Television
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arguing with whom, giving perhaps the most weight (and certainly equal
weight) to outrageous or extreme claims, while doing very little to help
the public see the details of proposals or the validity of claims about
them. To the degree that President Clinton had to rely only on media
coverage to get his plan across to the American people, he was certain to
face an erosion of sympathy and a ~ady increase of public
disillusionment.
Throughout 1993-94, moreover, reform-minded politicians and
groups in and around the Democratic party were never able to uarte in
wholehearted support of the Health Security proposal. Clinton’s plan for
health reform was not based on the major alternatives to which
Democrats had been loyal before 1993, and the new President did not
attract most Democrats to his specific approach. Democrats treated the
President’s bill as ~ for protracted bargaining over this or that
provision, and as fodder for infinitely complicated legislative
manoeuvrings in five different House and Senate committees.~
Continuing policy disagreements greatly undercut not only the
explieability and credibility of Clinton’s plan once it was officially
announced, but also the possibilities for any compromise to be brokered
in the Congress.
A Proposal that Was Never Explained
There were also problems inherent in the Clinton plan itself. The
plan was inuicate, and called for daring leaps of innovative
organlsation-building. At the same time, its supports were ambivalent
Coverage of the Health Care Reform Debate, January 16 - July 25, 1994", a report by
the Annenberg Public Policy Cert,’e, funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
(Plfiladalphia, PA, August 12, 1994); and Joseph N. Capl~na and Kathleen Hall
JamJeson. "Public Cynicism and News Coverage in Campaigns and Policy Debates",
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association,
New York City, September 4, 1994.
An excellent account of Congressional muneeuverings appears in Allen Schick,
"How a Bill didn~ Become a Law", in How Congeess Shapea Health Policy, edited by
Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Omstein (Washington DC: Brookings Institution,
1995).
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about explicitly discussing the governmental mechamsms that would be
involved in implementing the new arrangements.
Many commentators have condemned the Clinton plan for its
"complexity", much of which was actually inherent in the existing
private/public arrangements that the President wanted to modify, not
revolufionise. In any event, sheer complexity was not the major
difficult3,. When the Medicare programme of health insurance for the
elderly was debated and enacted in the mid-1960s, the legislation ~nas
very complicated, but its sponsors had the advantage of being able to
build on widespread public understanding of and affection for the
by-then well-established Social Security programme of enntlibutory
retirement insurance.29 The core of public support was built on an
analogy to a well-regarded earlier federal government programme. The
elderly, and man), others in American society, appreciated the universal
and non-means-tested nature of Social Security; and they had an
operational image of how earmarked payroll taxes worked to fund
federally administered benefits for individual elderly people.
When he introduced his 1993 Health Security bill, President Clinton
tried to invoke the Social Security precedent once again. This time,
however, the analog3, was purely rhetorical; it held only for the goal of
universal, secure coverage. There was no relevant analog3, to Social
Security with regard to how governmental mechanisms in the proposed
Clinton Health Security system would actually work.
The key mechanism in the new Health Security plan was the
mandatory purchasing co-operative, something the Clmtouites decided to
label the "health care alliance". One or more of these new governmental
institutions would be established in each state, and the3, would have all
sorts of revenue-channelling, data-collecting, information-disbursing,
and legal powers in relation to employers, insurance companies, and
individual citmens. Supporters seeking to explain the proposed Clinton
health plan never found any consistent examples of pre-existing
organisations that health alliances could be said to resemble. Sometimes
alliances were said to resemble food co-ops or grain co-ops for farmers.
29 Lawrence IL Jacobs, The Health of Nations and the Making of American and
Brqn~h Health Policy (Ithaca, NY: Comell University Press, 1993), Chapter 9.
17
Although one or another of these analogies may have resonated for
particular audiences, there was no clear, convincing, well-understood,
and popular federal programme precedent - nothing that could serve as
Social Securrty did for Medicare. Citizens were left to imagine the health
alliances arising out of nowhere. Not surprisingly, in a poll taken in
February 1994, only one in four Americans claimed to know what a
"health alliance" might be.3°
Because Bill Clinton was trying to be a "New Democrat" rather than
a ’~tax and spend", ’~’aditional liberal Democrat", the promoters of his
Health Security plan tried to avoid discussing the alliances as new sorts
of governmental orgamsations. Instead of telling Americans as simply
and clearly as possible why this kind of governmemal endeavottr would
be effective and desirable, instead of explaining how the new regulations
would work, their accommodation to the public’s distrust of government
was to pretend that President Clinton was proposing a virtually
government-free national health security plan. Alliances were portrayed
as if they were giant voluntary groups.31 Promoters operated like
advertisers, using images of voluntarism and words about choice to
prevent, or calm, Americans’ fears about government takeovers or
bungling in the health care system. Arguably, however, vague and
evasive explanations of the new system merely leR Americans open to
alternative descriptions purveyed by the plan’s fiercest opponents. A
portrayal of the Clinton plan as a vast set of voluntary associations
simply was not plausible. If that was all the President had in mind, why
did he need to ask Congress to enact a 1,342-page bill?
~0 Blendan, Hyams, and Bensort, "American Public and Critical Choices", p. 1543.
3t As, for example, in the explanatory pamphlet "Health Security:. the President’s
Health Care Plan," which was distributed by the Clinton Administration starting in
the fall of 1993. Pages 8 and 9 of the pamphlet discuss "The System After Reform",
describing health alliances as "groups of individuals, families, and local businesses
who use their combined purchasing power Io negotiate for high quality, affordable
health care." The word CHOICE appears like a mantra throughout the pamphlet. We
are asanred that "the President specifically rejected a govemmanl-nm health care
system and broad b~ed taxes" and that the "US Government will create a framework
for reform and than get out of the way". We do not learn how the fa’amework will be
created.
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An Ideal Foil for Anti-Government Countermobilisation
While US supporters of comprehensive health reform faltered in late
1993 and early 1994, opponents swung into action without delay or
ambivalence. Many groups with an occupational or financial stake in the
present US health care system had already mobilised to present concerns
to the Clinton Task Force. The minute the Clinton plan officially
appeared, all of those groups could quickly decide how disappointed or
angry they were with each relevant detail of the vast plan. Their leaders
and staffs could unmediately gear up to notify their own members across
the country about threatemng features of the plan, to run press
conferences, and to lobby in Congress for changes. Well-endowed and
vitally threatened groups (like the Health Insurance Association of
America, the association of smaller insurers who might have been put
out of business had the Clinton plan passed) could also fund public
relations campaigns designed to influence public opinion against the
Clinton overhaul. In the end, according to a study by the Washington
DC-based Centre for Public Integrity, health care reform would become
"the most heavily lobbied legislative initiative in recent US history".
During 1993 and 1994, "hundreds of special interests cumulatively ...
[spent] in excess of $100 million to influence the outcome of this public
policy issues".32
At first, neither pubhc opinion nor political observers were much
influenced by complaints of the many groups that had a stake in the
existing health care system. These were understood to be opening
gambits in bargaining over the details of legislation to be hammered out
in Congress. President Clinton himself kept saying that he was not
wedded to all the details of his proposal, that he was prepared to make
changes. Most early critiques of the Clinton plan were accompanied by
disclaimers that their sponsors joined the President in wanting
comprehensive reforms of some sort.
From very early on, however, there were hints of a much more
hard-edged, total, and sincerely ideological opposition to comprehensive,
governmentally sponsored health reform. Toward the end of 1993,
32 Centre for Public Integrity, Well-Healed: Inside Lobbying for Health Care
Reform (Wa~hJnglon I)(2, July 1994).
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right-wing Republicans realised that their ideological fortunes within
their o~aa party, as well as the Republican partisan interest in weakening
the Democrats as a prelude to winning control of Congress and the
presidency, could be splendidly served by first demonising and then
totally defeating the Clinton plan. William Kristol of the recently
founded "Project for the Republican Future" started to issue a stead),
stream of strategy memos urging all-out partisan warfare.
Public support for the Clinton plan had begun to erode since
September, Kristol pointed out, and "an aggressive and uncompromising
counter-strategy" by the Republicans could ultnuately kill the plan, if it
convinced middle-class Americans that there really was not a national
health care crisis, after all. Noting that polls showed most Americans to
be satisfied with their personal health care, ~1 argued that
Republicans should "insistently convey the message that mandatory
health alliances and government price controls will destroy the character,
quality, and inventiveness of American medical care".33
During 1994 the hard-line conservative attack on Clinton’s Health
Securrty plan brought together more and more allies, and channelled
resources and support toward anti-govemraent conservatives within the
Republican Party. Ideologues and think tanks launched lurid attacks on
Clinton’s health reform plan?4 Small business people in the National
Federation of Independent Businesses and other associations mobilised
against the proposed "employer mandate".35 Portrayals of the Clinton
plan as a bureaucratic takeover by welfare-state liberals were regular
grist for Rush Uunbaugh and other right-wing hosts of hundreds
3~ William Kristol, "Defeating President Clinton’s Health Care Proposal",
Washington DC: Project for the Republican Future, December 2, 1993 (in typescript),
pp. I-4. See also "Kristol Ball: William Kristol Looks at the Future of the GOP",
PolicyRevieu,, No. 67 (Winter 1993), p. 15.
~’ For the Heritage Foundatien’s attack, see Robert E. Moffit, "Clinton’s
Frankenstein: The Gory Details of the President’s Health Plan", Policy Review, No. 67
(Winter 1993), pp. 4-12. See also "No Exit", The New Republic (February 7, 1994),
pp. 21-25, by Maahattan Institute intellectual Elizabeth MeCaughey, v,~ho ~ soon to
run for Lieutenant Governor in New York on the Republican ticket.
~ Cathie Jo Martin, "Mandating Social Change: The Struggle Within Corporate
America Over National Health Reform", paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association. New York City, September 1-4, 1994.
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news-talk radio programmes that reach tens of millions of listeners
(indeed more than half of voters surveyed at polling places in the
November 1994 election said they tuned to such sho~% and the most
frequent listeners voted Republican by a 3 to 1 ratio),s6 Similarly,
Christian Coalition groups, already attacking Bill and Hillary Clinton on
cultural issues, began to devote substantial resources to the anti-health
reform crusade. On February 15, 1994 the Coalition’s Executive
Director Ralph Reed "announced a $1.4 million campaign to build
grass-roots opposition to the Clinton plan", with tactics to "include 30
million postcards to Congress distributed to 60,000 churches; radio
commercials in 40 Congressional districts and print advertisements in 30
newspapers" .37
Moderate Republicans who had initially been inclined to work out
some sort of compromise began to back-pedal in the face of such
anti-reform pressures from within their own partT. And interest groups
whose leaders had been prepared to bargain over reforms soon were
pressured by constituents and Republican leaders to back off from
co-operation with the Clinton administration or Congressional
Democrats.38 Both the US Chamber of Commerce, a leading business
association, and the American Medical Association, the major
physicians’ organisation, backed away from initial willingness to
negotiate over comprehensive health insurance reforms under pressure
from conservatives determined to defeat any kind of reform.
36 These facts come from Timothy Egan, "Triumph Leaves No Targets for
Conservative Talk shows", New York Times, Sunday, January 1, 1995, pp. 1 and 22.
For a sense of how Rush Limbaugh discussed the Clinton plan, see his See, 1 Told You
So (New York: Pocket Star Books, 1993), especially pp. 167-174, where ridicule of
Hillary Rodham Clinton is a nmxm~ therne.
37 Robin Toner, "Hillary Clinton Opens Campaign to Answer Critics of Health
Plan", New York Times, Wednesday, Fcbruary 16, 1994, p. Al I.
~t Such prcssurcs are discussed in Martin, "Mandating Social Change", and in
Graham K_ Wilson, "Interest Groups in the Health Care Debate", paper prepared for
the Conference on "Health Reform: Past and Present", Brookings Institution,
Washington DC, January 23-24, 1994.
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From Social Security in 1935 to Health Security in 19947
Despite all the resources - of money, moral commitment, and grass
roots communications networks - that the conservative US right could
mobilise, the question remains why such attacks proved as influential as
they did over the course of 1994. Middle-class Americans were (and
remain) concerned about both the security of their access to affordable
health care and the overall state of the nation’s health financing system.
As we have seen, centrist Democrat Bill Clinton had done his best to
define a market-oriented, minimally disruptive approach to national
health care reform; and his plan was initially well received.
Nevertheless, by mid-summer 1994, and on through the November
election, many middle-class citizens - not members of far-right groups,
but Independents, moderate Democrats and Republicans, and former
Perot voters - had come to perceive the Clinton plan as a misconceived
"big government" effort that might threaten the quality of US health care
for people like themselves.
Of course, 1994 is hardly the first time when US political
conservatives and business groups have used lurid anti-statist rhetoric to
attack Democrat-sponsored social programmes. For example, back in
1934-35 conservatives argued that the American way of life would come
to an end if Social Security was enacted. Congress passed it anyway.
But the overall governmental situation that Franklin Roosevelt and the
Democrats faced in debating Social Security in the mid-1930s was
instructively very different from the context in which President Clinton
fashioned and fought for his Health Security programme. It is not just
that Democrats enjoyed much greater electoral and Congressional
majorities in 1935 (after all, many Democrats back then were Southern
conservatives who often opposed federal government initiatives). The
more important differences between Social Security and Health Security
have to do with the/c/nds of governmental activities they called for, and
how their respective programme designs related to pre-existing
stakeholders in the given policy area.
Some officials and experts involved in planning the Social Security
legislation introduced in 1934 wanted to include a provision for health
insurance, but President Roosevelt and his advisers ~,isely decided to set
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that aside. Because physicians and the American Medical Association
were ideologically opposed to governmental social provision, and were
organisationally present in every Congressional district, Roosevelt
feared that they might sink the entire Social Security bill if health
insurance were included.39 Instead, Social Security focused on
unemployment and old-age insurance and public assistance
Parts of Social Security called for new payroll taxes, yet these taxes
were tiny, and came at a time when most US employees paid few taxes
and were mainly worried not about taxes, but about getting or holding
onto jobs. Of course, business leaders hated the new taxes; but in the
midst of the Great Depression business opposition carried little weight
with public opinion or elected officials, and could be overridden. Beyond
promising employed citizens new insurance protections, Social Security
also offered federal subsidies to public assistance and health
programmes that already existed, or were being enacted, by most of the
states. Roosevelt administration policymakers wanted to accompany the
new subsidies with a modicum of national administrative supervision,
but Congress stripped most such prerogatives out of the bill before k
became law. In the end, the Social Security Act mostly promised to
distribute moneT. Citizens (and state and local governmeuts) were wooed
with promised benefits, and not threatened with the reorganisation of
services to which they already felt accustomed.4°
Think of the contrast between Social Security and President
Clinton’s Health Security proposal. Clinton’s plan was formulated during
the "post-Reagan" political and governmental era, when taxes are
electerally anathema and public budgeting is extraordinarily tight. Thus
the proposed Health Security legislation was deliberately designed to
J9 Daniel S. Hirshfield, The Lost Reform: the Campaign for Compulsory Health
Insurance in the United States from 1932 to 1943 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1970), Chapter 2.
’0 The one new national programme eaacted in 1935, contributory retirement
insurance, came in an area where state governments had not previously legislated.
What is more, the few corporate pensions plans that had developed during the 1920s
mostly collapsed during the Depression. What we today call "social security" was thus
fashioned on uncluttered terrai~
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offer little new federal revenue to most people or groups:~ What is
more, it was put forward Lathe midst of a US health care system already
crowded with many institutional stakeholders, and where most
middle-class employees already had health insurance coverage of some
sort. Although the Clinton plan offered new coverage to millions of
uninsured, and promised new levels of security to the already-insured, it
also entailed a lot of new regulations that would push and prod
insurance companies, health care providers, employers, and state
governments. These new regulations were designed in an intricate and
fairly tight way precisely in order to ensure that rising private and public
health care costs really would come down.
Historically, Americans have been perfectly happy to benefit flom
federal government spending, and even to pay taxes to finance spending
that is generous and benefits the privileged groups and citizens, not just
the poor.42 Such benefits are especially appealing if the3’ flow in
administratively streamlined and relatively automatic ways. But
Americans dislike federal government regulations not accompanied by
generous monetary pay-offs. Ironically, precisely because Bill Clinton, a
refornust Democrat, was working so hard to save money, he
inarh,ertently ended up designing a health reform plan that appeared to
promise lots of new regulations without widespread pay-offs.
Established participants in the current US health care system became
increasingly worried that the Clinton plan might squeeze or recognme the
"* It is true that the Task Force incorporated certain s~’seteners for key interests
into the Health Security bill. The elderly on Medicare were to get additional
prescription drug and lang-tema care benefits; and General Motors and other large
eorpomtious "~Sth generous health plans were to get government subsidisation of early
retirees. But these sweeteners were fairly minor in the overall scheme, and even their
intended beneficiaries doubted that they would survive Congressional deliberations.
Fiscal constraints operated on Congress as well as the President, making it difficult
for any group to be given - or reliably promised - federal subsidies.42 This argument is developed in Theda Skoepol, "Targeting Within Universaliszm
Politically Viable Policies to Combat Poverty in the United States", in The Urban
Underclass, edited by Christopher Jeneks and Paul E. Petersun (Washington De:
Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 411-436; also reprinted as Chapter 8 in Theda
Skoepul, Social Policy in the United States: Future Possibilities in Historical
Perspective (Prineelon, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).
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way they were accustomed to delivering, financing, or receiving health
care. The fight-wing critique of meddlesome governmental
"bureaucracy" resonated so widely because it focused such worries.
From a broad historical perspective, in sum, Clinton’s Health
Security plan had many strikes against it from the start. The very
societal and governmental contexts that originally made it quite rational
for a centrist Democratic President to choose a reform approach
emphasising firmly regulated "competition within a budget"
simultaneously made that approach ideal for political
counter-mobilisafion by anti-governmental conservatives. The President
and his allies could have done a bctter job than they did at explaining the
regulator), mechanisms in their plan. But even ff the Clinton
administration had communicated more effectively, the Health Security
plan launched so propitiously in September 1993 might still have gone
down to a defeat that backfired badly against the Democrats. The
bedrock fact is that the Clinton plan promised too much cost-cutting
regulation and not enough payoffs to organised groups and middle-class
citizens pleasantly ensconced in the existing US health system.
What Happens Next for the US Social Security State?
Although they repudiated man), incumbent Congressional
Democrats, Americans who voted in the 1994 mid-term elections
continued to care deeply about governmentally sponsored health care
reform.43 Hefty majorities of voters told pollsters that they favoured
definite steps toward covering the currently uninsured, especially
children and low-income people. Most also opposed any cuts in
government spending on Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the
poor, as well opposing cuts in the enduringly popular Social Security
programme.
But such US cilazen expectations have not determined what has
happened in recent US politics. Following their November 1994
triumph, anti-welfare-state Republicans treated their "Contract with
America" as a blueprint for governing. The Contract had nothing to say
about health care reform, yet it emphasised welfare cuts, destruction of
4~ See note "National Election Night Survey’. refereaeed in note 6 above.
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federal regulations, and huge tax cuts disproportionately targeted on
business and the top income quinfiles. In order to achieve the order of
tax and spending cuts they promised, Congressional Republicans have
moved during 1995 to slash funding for the exSsting public health
insurance programmes, Medicaid and Medicare.
Overall, conservative Republicans have in mind abolishing Medica~e
m favour of tax-subsidised vouchers or individual medical savings
accounts, combined with efforts to encourage the elderly to enroll in
for-profit managed care plans.~ Their basic goal is to break up the
universal coverage of publicly sponsored health insurance for the
elderly, shifting the healthier and wealthier into subsidised private
coverage, while severely shrinldng the funding available to those who
remain in the public part of Medicare. As Medicare becomes
increasingly a "welfare programme" for the less privileged, tax funding
for it can then be further cut, as funding for Medicaid is now being cut.
Republicans are also trying to remove federal guarantees of coverage for
the poor from Medicaid, turning it into a purely state-run programme. If
Republicans win the US presidency in 1996 while holding controls of
Congress, they will continue to cut back on America’s public-sector
health spending. They can also be expected to undertake fundamental
reorganisations of the very popular Social Security programme. Their
overall goal is to greatly shrink the domestic, social-welfare role of
government in the United States, in favour of private market "solutions"
to social problems.
Health insurance reform remains potentially a good issue for the US
Democratic party, because the numbers of uninsured people, mostly in
low-wage working families, continue to rise. And Republican-sponsored
changes are sure to prove unpopular. But the Democrats are in deep
electoral and intellectual disarray, and are not likely to achieve
credibility on health care or other problems until they come to terms with
the overall political challenges they face. Defending Medicare may help
Robin Toner, "Gingrich Promises Medicare Tough Look, Bottom to Top", New
York Times, Tuesday, Janual-y 31, 1995, pp. 1 and AI4. Of course this is highly ironic,
given that conservatives attacked the Clinton Health Security plan for allegedly
aiming to drive Americans into managed care plans!
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the Democrats politically over the near term, but such defence alone will
not address the broader issues of cost and coverage that inspired
President Clinton’s 1993 effort in the first place. Nor will a defence of
Medicare alone succeed in re-legitimating the role of the US national
government as a guarantor of citizens’ welfare.
Very possibly, Americans who favour, governmentally mediated
universal health insurance have just had - and lost - their last
opportunity for achieving it. Repeatedly over the course of the twentieth
century, reform-minded US professionals pushed for government
financing of health care for all, or large categories, of Americans. Again
and again comprehensive plans for "rational" and "cost-efficient"
reforms were drawn up, amidst considerable or great optimism that at
last ’~die time was ripe" for the United States to join the rest of the
civilised democratic-industrial world in providing broad health care
coverage for its citizens. Most such attentpts were defeated by locally
entrenched groups who were able to work through Congress to defeat an
attempt to extend national government intervention in health markets and
in doctor-patient relationships. Only once did such efforts succeed,
during mid-1960s when Medicare and Medicaid were enacted at the
height of the Great Society.4~
Not only did that single success come at a juncture when liberal
Democrats, very briefly, enjoyed the kind of ideological 61an and
Congressional leverage that conservative Republicans enjoy in 1994.
The rnid-1960s was also a time when Americans overwhelmingly trusted
the federal government to do good and effective things, when Americans
even briefly thought that the federal government might wage a winning
"war on poverty". Perhaps even more important, this ~s a time when
Social Security, a universal social insurance programme could serve as a
positive model for how the federal government could extend
non-demeaning health security to all of the elderly.
Health reformers searching for optimistic historical analogies often
take heart in the example of President Harry Truman. After his
campaign for universal health insurance was defeated in 1948-50,
4s Jacobs, Health of Nations, Chapter 9; and Theodore R. Marmor, The Politics of
Medicare (Chicago, IL: Aldine, t 973).
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Truman and his allies devised an "incremental" strategy that eventually
led to the enacmaent of Medicare in 1965.~ Reformers dream of doing
this again, perhaps pushing forward towaxd universal health insurance
by next focusing on extending coverage to all American ch.iklren.47 But
today the policy legacies and governmental conditions are not so
favourable as they were .in the wake of Truman’s presidency. Now a
fully mature programme, Social Security has become since the 1980s an
object of persistent criticism by fiscal conservatives in the Concord
Coalition and beyond who consider its universalism to be ’~)o
expen~ve" for the federal government to preserve in the future.4s
Current (and likely near-future) smJggles in Washington focus on how
to cut taxes and federal spending, not on their gradual expansion, as was
the case under moderate Republicans and Democrats during the 1950s
and early 1960s. Democrats may look back wistfully to Harry Truman,
cherishing his improbable electoral triumphs and the progressive
legacies that grew even out of his policy failures. But Truman and his
post-~ar era of US governance are truly dead and gone.
Even an issue like health security - central as it is for many
Americans - will not, in itself, bring about a political revival for
Democrats or a resurgence of faith in the social-wdfare role of the US
national government. As the failure of President Clinton’s Health
Security effort shows, the future of inclusive social policymaking in the
United States depends on Americans’ coming to believe that government
can offer minimally intrusive solutions to the heartfelt needs of
individuals and families. If progressives are actually to achieve universal
health care coverage in America’s futttre, it will be because new
rationales for the role of government, and new majority political
alliances, have been achieved first.
Monte M. Po~, Harry S. Truman Versus the Medical Lobby." Th¢ Genesis of
Medicare Columbia, MO: iJnivcrsity of Missouri Press, 1979).
~ See the call for such an approach by the Editorial Board of the New York Times
in "Anybody Home7", New York Times, Sunday, January 8, 1995, p. El8.
a See Peter G. Petcrson, Facing Up (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993). I
discuss the attacks on "entitleanunts" in "Renmking US Soc’ml Policies for the 21st
Cezttu~*, the eon¢itlsinn to Social Policy in the United States.
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American progressives seeking centre-left electoral majorities will
have to travel a long road to regeneration, much as Britain’s Labour
Party has done over the last generation. At present, however, the way
forward for US progressives is barely discernible. Much work remains
to be done, both intellectual and political.
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